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 A PERFECT STORM 
 
According to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna, “a 
perfect storm of drugs, crime and insurgency that 
has  swirled  around  the  Afghanistan/Pakistan 
border for years, is heading for Central Asia”.
1 
Afghanistan is the major producer of the 
world’s opiates and cannabis. From there 
the drugs are trafficked chiefly to Europe, 
Russia,  Iran,  Pakistan  and  China.  Drug 
trafficking and consumption are linked to 
other  crime,  turning  Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan  into  narco-
states.  Furthermore,  money  generated  by 
the  drugs  trade  is  being  channelled  to 
insurgent  movements,  not  only  in 
Afghanistan but also in Central Asia. 
If  the  international  community  does  not 
act swiftly and in unison, this will not only 
have an impact on drug related crime and 
consumption  worldwide  but  also 
jeopardise  the  vast  energy  reserves  in 
Central Asia and risk further destabilising 
the Caucasus.  
Counter-narcotics  in  Afghanistan  are  an 
area where NATO’s and Russia’s interests 
clearly  coincide.  If  NATO  and  Russia 
cannot  find  a  way  of  effectively 
cooperating in this matter, not only will the 
                                                 
1Addiction, Crime and Insurgency, The Transnational Threat of Afghan 
Opium Addiction, Crime and Insurgency, United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, Vienna, October 2009, p. 3. 
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out  of  control,  but  NATO-Russia 
cooperation could come under pressure. 
 THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Afghan opiates kill 100,000 people a year 
globally. Every year NATO countries lose 
over  10,000  people  to  heroin  overdoses, 
i.e. five times more than the total number 
of  troops  killed  in  Afghanistan  since  the 
beginning of military intervention in 2001 
(as  of  4  July  2010,  the  total  number  of 
ISAF casualties stood at 1822). In Russia 
an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 people die 
of drug overdoses yearly. This amounts to 
more  than  the  total  number  of  soldiers 
killed during the entire Soviet campaign in 
Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 (about 
14,000). 
Moreover, roughly 8 percent of the Afghan 
population between 15 and 64 years of age 
is  now  addicted  to  drugs.  Opium 
consumption jumped by 53 percent the last 
four  years  to  230,000  addicts  and  heroin 
consumption by 140 percent to 120,000.
2 
Afghanistan  not  only  produces  over  90 
percent of the world’s opiates,
3 it also has 
surpassed  Morocco  in  2009  as  the  main 
producer  of  cannabis.
4  Opium  derivates 
from  Afghanistan  are  swamping  global 
markets.  Europe  without  Russia  and 
Turkey is the largest end user, consuming 
711  metric  tonnes.  Russia,  with  a 
population three times smaller than that of 
the EU, is the largest single consumer with 
549  metric  tonnes.  Iran,  with  547  metric 
tonnes, has one of the world’s most serious 
drug problems with an estimated 1 million 
opiate users. Pakistan consumes 214 metric 
tonnes.  The  countries  of  Central  Asia, 
                                                 
2 Drug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey. Executive summary, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 2010, p. 5. 
3 Addiction, Crime and Insurgency, p.7. 
4 Afghanistan cannabis survey, United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, Vienna, April 2010, p.5. 
once  mainly  transit  avenues  for  Afghan 
drugs, have become major consumers.
  
The global heroin market generates up to 
65  billion  USD.  Afghanistan  farmers, 
however, receive only about 1 billion USD, 
prompting President Karzai to say “we take 
3 percent of the revenue and 100 percent of the 
blame”.
5  Russia,  Europe,  the  U.S.  and 
Canada make up 59 percent of the world 
opiates market. Yearly Afghanistan exports 
about 3500 metric tonnes worldwide (1/3 
raw, 2/3 processed into heroin). There are 
an  estimated  12,000  metric  tonnes 
stockpiled and temporarily withheld from 
the  world  market  awaiting  higher  market 
prices. 
  
Only a small amount of transiting drugs is 
intercepted before reaching their markets. 
Iran,  China  and  Pakistan  intercept  20 
percent,  18  percent  and  17  percent 
respectively.  Turkey  intercepts  about  9 
percent. In Central Asia and Russia 4 to 5 
percent  is  seized.  Afghanistan  only 
intercepts  2  percent.  More  worryingly, 
Croatia,  Bosnia,  Serbia,  Macedonia  and 
Montenegro,  and  EU  member  states  like 
Bulgaria,  Romania  and  Greece  only 
intercept 2 percent. 
6 
RUSSIA’S INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Russia’s  perceptions  of  Afghanistan  are 
still  influenced  by  the  “Afghan  syndrome” 
caused  by  the  fiasco  of  the  Soviet 
intervention  in  the  eighties.  Russian 
authorities stress time and again that they 
are  not  contemplating  sending  troops  to 
Afghanistan.
7  
                                                 
5 Addiction, Crime and Insurgency, p. 2. 
6 Ibid., p. 7. 
7 E.g., Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov said at the Annual 
Asia Security Summit in Singapore on 6 June 2010, that “with 
memories of the Soviet defeat there still strong, never again will Russian 
soldiers be sent to Afghanistan”.  
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The  two  main  threats  Russia  perceives 
emanating  from  the  situation  in 
Afghanistan are the prospect of instability 
spreading  throughout  Central  Asia  and 
drug trafficking. Therefore, Russia has no 
interest  in  seeing  ISAF  fail  in  stabilising 
Afghanistan, or at least, keeping it under 
control.  
However,  as  Russia  seeks  to  get  Central 
Asia back in its orbit, it looks at the war in 
Afghanistan through the prism of America 
retaining a foothold in the region.   
According  to  Dmitri  Trenin  and  Alexey 
Malashenko, views as to Russia’s objectives 
in  Afghanistan  within  the  Russian 
establishment differ.
8 Some would like to 
see  the  U.S.  and  NATO  getting  bogged 
down  in  the  “graveyard  of  empires”  while 
keeping the Taliban in check. Others hope 
that,  by  supporting  ISAF,  Russia  will  be 
able  to  reap  benefits  in  other  diplomatic 
issues of more importance to itself. A third 
group wishes to see a neutral Afghanistan, 
stable but free from foreign troops, acting 
as a buffer between Central Asia and the 
volatile region of Iran and Pakistan.  
Russia  has  been  involved  in  all  major 
international  diplomatic  decisions 
regarding  Afghanistan.  It  supported  the 
UN  mandate  for  an  international 
operation,
9  and  was  party  to  the  Bonn 
Agreement  in  2001  which  laid  down  the 
parameters of rebuilding state structures in 
post-Taliban Afghanistan.
10 Medvedev also 
explicitly  supported  Obama’s  new 
                                                 
8 Dmitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko, Afghanistan, a View 
from Moscow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, 
2010.  
9 UNSC resolution 1386. 
10Agreement  on  Provisional  Arrangements  in  Afghanistan 
Pending  the  Re-Establishment  of  Permanent  Government 
Institution, 22 December 2001. 
strategy.
11 Still, Russia’s support for ISAF 
proceeds laboriously. 
NATO-RUSSIA  COOPERATION  ON 
AFGHAN COUNTER-NARCOTICS 
 
In 2005 the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
launched  the  “NRC  Project  on  Counter-
Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian 
Personnel”.  The  NRC  works  in  close 
cooperation with UNODC which acts as 
the  executive  agent.  The  objective  is  to 
“build  local  capacity  and  to  promote  regional 
networking  and  cooperation  by  sharing  the 
combined expertise of NRC member states with 
mid-level officers from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, 
the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan”
12. 
Russia and Turkey run training courses for 
Afghan  and  Central  Asian  drug 
enforcement  agents  at  their  national 
training centres
13 and occasional courses in 
each of the six participating countries. The 
fact that the project was not interrupted in 
the  aftermath  of  the  war  in  Georgia  in 
August 2008 demonstrates the importance 
all parties attach to the project. 
ISAF’S ROLE IN COUNTER-NARCOTICS 
 
Although  nine  Security  Council 
Resolutions relate to ISAF, it is not a UN 
force  but  a  coalition  of  the  willing 
deployed  under  the  authority  of  the  UN 
Security Council. 
                                                 
11Joint  statement  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America Barack Obama and President of the Russian Federation 
D.A.  Medvedev  concerning  Afghanistan,  July  6,  2009, 
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2009/July/20090707174321xjsnommis0.9162801.html  
12 ‘High-level meeting on NATO-Russia counter-narcotics 
training project’, in: NATO website, 18-19 June 2010.  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_55800.htm  
13The  Turkish  International  Academy  against  Drugs  and 
Organized  Crime  (TADOC)  in  Ankara  and  the  Russian 
International Training Centre at Domodedovo near Moscow.  
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Within this framework ISAF is committed 
to  supporting  the  Afghan  government’s 
counter-narcotic  programme  within  its 
mandate. 
14 
ISAF’s  mandate  precludes  eradication 
operations. Moreover, UNODC does not 
at  present  believe  that  ISAF  should  get 
involved  in  eradication  at  the  farm  level. 
This  has  to  be  carried  out  by  Afghan 
authorities, but ISAF provides support to 
Afghan-led  eradication  programs  by 
deploying forces to increase security in the 
vicinity of areas where Afghan government 
agencies  are  conducting  eradication 
operations. 
The  mandate  also  provides  explicitly  for 
ISAF to support the Afghan government 
and  internationally-sanctioned  counter-
narcotics  efforts  through  intelligence-
sharing  and  the  conduct  of  an  efficient 
public information campaign, as well as to 
support the Afghan National Army Forces 
conducting  counter-narcotics  operations. 
ISAF, however, is not directly involved in 
poppy  eradication  or  destruction  of 
processing  facilities,  or  in  taking  military 
action against narcotic producers. 
ISAF  lends  support  in  a  whole  range  of 
counter-narcotic  activities  covered  by  the 
Afghan  National  Drugs  Control  Strategy. 
ISAF  has  aligned  its  counter-narcotic 
strategic communication plan with that of 
the  Afghan  government  and  it  facilitates 
government messaging on television, radio 
and  posters.  ISAF  Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) support and 
assist  alternative  crops  and  livelihood 
programmes  to  help  transition  to  licit 
farming  
                                                 
14 T h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  b a s e d  o n  the  speech  by  Brigadier  General 
Christophe  de  Saint  Chamas,  chief  CJ5  within  HQ  ISAF, 
presented in Moscow at the International Forum “Drug Production 
in  Afghanistan  – a  C h a l l e n g e  f o r  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m m u n i t y ”  on 
10June 2010. 
The  presence  of  125,000  ISAF  soldiers 
together  with  over  134,000  Afghan 
National  Army  soldiers
15  provides  an 
environment  in  which  counter-narcotic 
activities can be conducted. ISAF supports 
Afghan  law  enforcement  operations  on 
request  by  providing  medical  evacuation, 
surveillance and air support. 
In  2009  the  Afghan  law  enforcement 
agencies  conducted  81  interdiction 
operations, of which 53 were supported by 
ISAF.  This  resulted  in  the  capture  of  96 
metric tonnes of opium, 9 metric tonnes of 
morphine, and 1.2 metric tonnes of heroin 
together  with  almost  35,000  litres  of 
precursor  chemicals.  The  value  of  these 
seizures  in  Afghanistan  was  almost  50 
million USD. In the first three months of 
2010  ISAF  supported  56  similar 
operations. 
RUSSIA’S PERCEPTION  OF ISAF’S ROLE 
IN COUNTER-NARCOTICS 
 
Russia  perceives  its  drug  problem  as 
directly  related  to  the  situation  in 
Afghanistan.  It  underlines  that  drug 
trafficking, and in particular that of heroin 
has  skyrocketed  since  coalition  forces 
entered Afghanistan in 2001. 
16 
Russia  by  and  large  perceives  ISAF’s 
response  to  the  drug  problem  in 
Afghanistan  as  completely  insufficient. 
Some Russian observers see this as a sign 
that the war against terrorism and drugs are 
not  the  main  concern  for  the  U.S.  and 
NATO.  Especially,  ISAF’s  refusal  to 
participate directly in poppy eradication at 
the  farm  level  is  symptomatic  of  the 
                                                 
15 The goal is 260,000 soldiers by 2011. 
16 F o r  a  c r i t i c a l  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t e r -narcotics 
policy  in  Afghanistan  and  the  interdepartmental  disputes  on 
eradication  up  to  July  2008,  see  Schweich  Thomas,  “Is 
Afghanistan a Narco-State?” in: The New York Times Magazine, 27 
July 2008.  
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coalition  not  treating  Afghan  drug 
production  with  the  necessary  priority. 
Viktor Ivanov, the head of Russia's Federal 
Drug Control Service, although critical of 
ISAF’s track record dealing with narcotics, 
rejects conspiracy theories put forward in 
some  quarters  that  NATO  is  growing 
poppies  in  Afghanistan  to  undermine 
Russia. He does, however, argue that ISAF 
troops  are  reluctant  to  get  involved  in 
poppy  eradication  out  of  fear  of 
casualties.
17  The  Russian  argument  goes 
that it is the duty of the military to put the 
lives  of  the  Afghan  population  and  their 
own  populations  back  home  before  their 
own  safety.  As  such,  they  should  be 
prepared to risk retaliation by the people 
behind  opium  cultivation.  In  the  longer 
term  eradication  of  poppy  fields  would, 
furthermore, undercut terrorism.
18 
But  while  this  may  be  a  reasonable 
argument, even taking into account that it 
is  not  Russia’s  own  servicemen’s  lives 
which  are  being  discussed,  some  other 
insinuations  are  highly  provocative.  A 
paper distributed at the International Forum 
on  Drug  production  in  Afghanistan  in  June 
2010 in Moscow argues that the U.S. and 
NATO abuse their position in Afghanistan 
for geopolitical purposes, “using their unique 
position in Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO 
political  and  military  powers  have  a  unique 
opportunity  to  control  and  influence  Russia  and 
China,  the  largest  oil  producers  (Iran,  Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq) and crucial nuclear powers (India 
and Pakistan) from one location, and if need be, 
mobilize for military operations in the shortest time 
possible. In the short-term perspective, this would 
most  likely  be  against  Iran”.
  19  Furthermore, 
                                                 
17 Viktor Ivanov, The Afghan Drug Trap, Moscow: CVG, 2010, pp. 
58-59. 
18 According to recent UN figures, the Taliban is creaming off 
about 100 million USD a year from the narcotics business in 
Afghanistan.  
19 ‘ T h e  D e v e l o p i n g  D r u g  S i t u a t i o n  i n  A f g h a n i s tan’,  paper 
presented  at  the  International  Forum  “Drug  Production  in 
Afghanistan – a Challenge for the International Community”, held in 
Moscow on 9-10 June 2010, p. 7. 
the U.S. is promoting its own fight against 
the drug trade, which it considers the basic 
source  of  funding  terrorists  globally.  In 
doing so, the U.S. hopes to have one more 
excuse, next to proliferation of weapons of 
mass  destruction  in  Iran  and  terrorists 
hiding in Pakistan, also to deploy so-called 
peace keeping forces in these countries.
20 
The paper further contends that “the drug 
trade  is  being  used  to  maintain  military  and 
political  tension  in  the  country  and  the  entire 
Central Asian region”. 
21 
A  further  major  frustration  for  the 
Russians  is  what  Russia’s  permanent 
representative  to  NATO,  Ambassador 
Rogozin,  calls  the  "illogical"  contrast  of 
ISAF’s unwillingness to destroy drug crops 
in  Afghanistan  with  successful  U.S. 
eradication efforts in Colombia.
22 In 2008 
229,130  hectares  of  coca  fields  were 
destroyed  in  Columbia  against  only  5480 
hectares  of  poppy  fields  in  Afghanistan. 
Moreover,  the  discrepancy  between  the 
correlation between foreign troop numbers 
and  the  number  of  hectares  destroyed  is 
significant: more than 125,000 soldiers for 
5480  hectares  destroyed  in  Afghanistan 
and only 1,400 soldiers to 229,130 hectares 
eradicated in Columbia.
23  
In  spite  of  these  widespread  allegations, 
the  Russian  discourse  at  the  International 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 11. 
22 S p e e c h  a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F o r u m  “ Drug  Production  in 
Afghanistan – a Challenge for the International Community” on 9 June 
2010.  Rogozin,  known  for  his  outspokenness,  remained 
diplomatic  throughout  his  speech.  However,  Russia  Profile 
reports that he told them in the margin of the conference that 
“the only reason America is not eradicating Afghan opium poppies is that, 
unlike  Colombian  cocaine,  these  drugs  are  not  destined  for  America.” 
(Roland Oliphant, “Poppy Diplomacy”, in: Russia Profile, 10 June, 
2010).  However,  needless  to  say  that  the  circumstances  in 
Colombia differ substantially from those in Afghanistan and not 
taking them into account leads to oversimplification. 
23 The Afghan Drug Trap, p. 93.  
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Forum on Drug Production in Afghanistan was 
remarkably guarded.
24 The tone was set by 
the  opening  remarks  of  President 
Medvedev.  He  called  upon  all  parties 
involved to depoliticize the issue “And so 
political  games  around  what  is  without  any 
exaggeration a common global problem are simply 
unacceptable  as  they  undermine  our  common 
international efforts and weaken our entire anti-
drugs coalition”.
25  
RUSSIAN PROPOSALS 
 
Russia’s proposals are laid out in the ‘Plan 
“Rainbow-2”  for  the  Elimination  of  Afghan 
Drug  production’.  The  plan  calls  to  raise, 
through  the  UN  Security  Council,  the 
status  of  the  problem  of  Afghan  drug 
production  to  that  of  a  threat  to  global 
peace and security. It furthermore calls for 
elaborating  and  implementing  a 
programme  of  Afghan  economic 
development,  the  eradication  of  poppy 
crops, and to draw up a UN sanctions list 
of  landowners  who  provide  land  for 
growing  poppy.  It  would,  furthermore, 
include in ISAF’s mandate the obligation 
to  eradicate  opium  poppy  crops  in 
Afghanistan.  Especially  this  last  proposal 
promises  to  be  contentious  as  several 
NATO  countries  oppose  getting  directly 
involved in poppy eradication. 
                                                 
24 A  m a r k e d  e x c e p t i o n  w a s  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  S e m y o n  
Bagdasarov, a member of the State Duma International Affairs 
Committee, accusing NATO vocally of practically causing the 
drug  situation  in  Afghanistan  and  calling  for  the  CSTO  to 
intervene  in  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan  and  Uzbekistan,  and  more 
specifically in Badakhshan and the Fergana Valley. RIANovosti 
reported on 26 May that Bagdasarov said drug traffickers had 
penetrated "all structures of Afghan society, as well as the U.S. and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan". He also proposed to halt transit over 
Russia  to  Afghanistan  if  NATO  does  not  destroy  poppy 
plantations. 
25 Speech by President Dmitri Medvedev at the opening of the 
International forum Drug Production in Afghanistan - Challenge to the 
International  Community o n  9 J u n e  2 0 1 0 ,  
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/398.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Narcotics from Afghanistan are a clear and 
present danger, and dealing with the issue 
is of vital interest, both to Russia and to 
NATO.  Moreover,  drugs  are  intimately 
linked to international crime and terrorism.  
Fighting  the  Afghan  drug  scourge  is  an 
obvious, if not the area par excellence for 
NATO-Russia  cooperation.  The  existing 
initiatives  within  the  NRC  certainly  are 
worthwhile  but  insufficient.  Drastically 
reducing  the  flow  of  drugs,  especially  to 
Europe and Russia, and preventing Central 
Asia being destabilised by drugs has to be a 
priority. This not only involves eradication 
of  poppy  fields  but  also  interdicting  the 
drug  traffic,  providing  alternative  crops 
and  livelihoods,  interdiction  of  drug 
shipments,  arrest  of  traffickers  and 
building up an effective judicial system in 
Afghanistan.  
However,  the  threat  of  narcotics  is  such 
that  an  effective  eradication  programme 
should  not  be  held  hostage  to  a  lack  of 
progress  in  other  counter-narcotics 
activities. 
Voices are going up in Russia to make the 
level of support to ISAF conditional on the 
effectiveness  of  poppy  eradication  in 
Afghanistan.  On  the  other  hand,  Russia 
realises  that  ISAF’s  presence  serves  its 
interests not only in stabilising Afghanistan 
but also in preventing instability spreading 
from Afghanistan throughout Central Asia. 
If NATO and Russia cannot even agree on 
how to address a problem which is of such 
a vital interest to both parties, this will not 
bring all cooperation on Afghanistan to a 
standstill,  but  it  does  not  bode  well  for 
further effective cooperation in the NRC 
on Afghanistan. 
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